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Abstract 
This paper contributes to a growing body of literature studying investor sentiment. Separate 
sentiment measures for UK investors and UK institutional investors are constructed from 
commonly cited sentiment indicators using the first principle component method. We then 
examine if the sentiment measures can help predict UK equity returns, distinguishing between 
“turbulent” and “tranquil” periods in the financial markets. We find that sentiment tends to be a 
more important determinant of returns in the run-up to a crisis than at other times. We also 
examine if US investor sentiment can help predict UK equity returns, and find that US investor 
sentiment is highly significant in explaining the UK equity returns. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We investigate the influence on UK equity returns of foreign and local components of investor 
sentiment, using measures of sentiment for the UK and US.  The objectives of the paper are two.  
First we construct two new measures of investor sentiment for the UK at a weekly frequency, 
distinguishing between “market” and “institutional” sentiment, on the grounds that financial 
institutions may be expected to be better-informed about the stock market than other investors.  
Institutions may therefore develop sentiment about stocks in different ways from the market in 
general, for example: perhaps more rapidly or simply using different information sets.  Second, we 
study the impact of investor sentiment in the US and the UK on UK equity returns, both in general, 
and more specifically distinguishing between “tranquil” market periods and periods of “financial 
crisis”, when there were sharp falls in the market. 
 
Empirical studies of financial markets have uncovered numerous anomalies and puzzles, where 
asset returns behave in ways that traditional finance theories struggle to explain.  Examples include: 
short horizon stock price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), long-run mean reversion 
(Debondt and Thaler, 1985) and excess volatility (Shiller, 1981).  To explain these and other 
anomalies, finance research has been extended to include the direct study of market participants, 
integrating psychological insights with neo-classical economic theories.  Much of this literature is 
concerned with investor sentiment: its formation, development and possible impact on share 
returns.  Seminal examples include Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1974), De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann, (1990), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998), Odean (1998), 
and Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).  These studies demonstrate that investor sentiment may 
divert asset prices from their “rational, fundamental” values. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) define investor sentiment as “…a belief about future cash flows or 
investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand.”  Not surprisingly therefore, one of the 
most difficult empirical questions concerning investor sentiment is that of how it should be 
measured.  Three methods are common.  The first uses survey-based techniques that involve 
asking people about their thoughts and expectations about the stock market.  These aim to produce 
a measure of sentiment that captures the mood of investors.  Examples include the American 
Association of Individual Investors (AAII) and Investors Intelligence (II) surveys (Brown, 1999; 
Verma & Soydemir, 2006; Fong 20013).  More general indices such as the Consumer Confidence 
Index have also been studied (Schmeling, 2009).  The second method is to employ more “objective” 
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financial market indicators, such as the put-call trading ratio and indices of volatility (Wang, 
Keswani & Taylor, 2006).  Third are composed indices typically using principal components to 
extract a single sentiment measure from a variety of relevant economic and financial data (Brown 
and Cliff, 2004; and Baker and Wurgler, 2006). 
 
All three methods have their drawbacks.  Surveys are expensive to conduct reliably at high 
frequency and “quick” questionnaires may produce answers which are less reliable.  Financial 
market data are in theory more accurate but they involve a risk of circularity as they may simply 
reflect the outcome of share price movements rather than be an independent measure of sentiment.  
Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006) study the ratios of Put-call trading, Put-call open interest and 
Advances-to-declines; and find that these sentiment indices are Granger-caused by stock returns 
but do not themselves cause returns.  Finally, the use of principal components to create a 
composed index produces a variable which may not be very robust.  The composition of the 
principal components may change as new data become available, implying that the entire time 
series of sentiment may change over time.  However, composed indices are probably the most 
popular of the three sentiment measures, particularly in studies of US data, arguably because they 
do largely overcome the reliability issues of surveys and the independence issues of pure financial 
market data.   
 
In this paper we use principal components to construct indices of investor sentiment for UK 
market-wide sentiment and UK institutional investor sentiment.  Principal components analysis 
extracts orthogonal time series from a dataset in such a way that each successive principal 
component accounts for as much as possible of the (residual) variation in the dataset.  Brown and 
Cliff (2004) argue that the first principal component of various financial market indicators is 
sufficient to provide a reliable measure of unobserved sentiment.  This procedure is now a 
generally accepted method of measuring investor sentiment, and has been used inter alia by Baker 
and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Chen, Chong and Duan (2010), Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012), 
Chen, Chong and She (2014) and Bai (2014) to construct sentiment indices for various countries 
so as to examine the effect of sentiment on stock returns. Notwithstanding the popularity of this 
method, few composed sentiment indices have been constructed for the UK.  In fact, the only two 
as far as we are aware is an annual market-wide index by Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012), and a 
weekly market-wide index by Bai (2014) based on the Baker and Wurgler (2006) approach.  
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Furthermore, there are no survey-based investor sentiment indices available for the UK
1
. 
 
In contrast, the UK market-wide investor sentiment index composed in our paper includes a more 
comprehensive range of investor sentiment proxies, based as it is on combining the approaches of 
Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker and Wurgler (2006).  We also construct an index of institutional 
investor sentiment, the first such that has been constructed for the UK. Institutional investors 
increasingly dominate world-wide equity-holdings, particularly in the UK and the US (Davis, 
2002). According to Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, released by Office for National Statistics
2
, 
the percentage of total market value of UK quoted shares owned by Unit trusts and investment 
trusts increased from 10.1% in 1994 to 18% in 2012, and foreign share ownership increased from 
16.3% to 53.2% in the same period. 83.4% of the foreign owners in 2012 are financial institutions. 
It is therefore important to understand whether institutional sentiment differs markedly from 
general market sentiment and how any differences affect stock price movements. 
  
The second objective of the paper is to study the impact of sentiment on stock returns in the UK.  
There is broad agreement that, even after controlling for “rational” influences such as mean-
variance (Yu and Yuan, 2011) and Fama-French factors
3
 (Xu and Green, 2013), indicators of 
sentiment do contribute significantly to explaining the time series and cross-sectional behaviour of 
stock returns in a variety of settings.  The preponderance of the evidence from a variety of datasets 
and measures of sentiment is that unusually high levels of sentiment tend to be associated with 
increased trading (Brown, 1999), greater volatility (Lee, Jiang and Indro, 2002), and lower returns 
(Brown and Cliff, 2004; Schmeling, 2009).   
 
Furthermore, evidence for the US suggests that there are differences between the effects of market 
and institutional sentiment and as among different types of firm and market environment.  Brown 
and Cliff (2004) find that the negative relationship between sentiment and stock returns differs in 
strength between the AAII and II surveys; and is stronger for large or growth firms than for small 
or mature firms.  However, virtually all this evidence concerns US sentiment and US stock returns, 
with only limited extant research on other countries.  In addition, the outcomes of possibly 
sentiment-driven behaviour such as momentum and reversal have been shown to vary 
systematically as between up-markets and down-markets (Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed, 2004); 
                                                 
1
 The European Commission Business and Consumer Surveys for EU members is only available monthly and is 
concerned with general business and consumer confidence rather than investor or financial market sentiment. 
2
 Data source: www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/index.html?content-type=Dataset&edition=tcm%3A77-
308158 
3
  Fama and French (1996). 
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but to our knowledge the direct impact of sentiment on returns in different market states has not 
been investigated. We study the relation between sentiment and UK stock returns, distinguishing 
on the one hand between general market and institutional sentiment, and on the other between 
large, mid-size and small stock portfolios.  We also distinguish between “tranquil” and “crisis” 
periods in the stock market and between “high” and “low” sentiment periods. 
 
Finally, we examine the relative strength of UK and foreign sentiment (represented by US 
sentiment) in the determination of UK stock returns.  Becjann et al. (2011), Baker, Wurgler and 
Yuan (2012) and Bai (2014) discuss three channels through which investor sentiment contagion 
may occur.  First, if investors in one country are optimistic (say) about investment prospects in 
another country, they may bid up the shares of that particular country.  Second, if investors in one 
country are optimistic, this may cause a general shift into risky assets, including international 
equities. Both these channels postulate that the effect of foreign sentiment on home country share 
prices occurs through market purchases by foreign residents. Third, when foreign investors are 
optimistic about their own economy this leads to domestic investors being optimistic about the 
local economy due to the linkage between the two economies, the foreign sentiment affecting 
domestic share prices indirectly via domestic sentiment.  
 
We argue that there is a fourth possible mechanism: sentiment in a foreign country may affect 
sentiment in the home country directly because of the herding instinct of noise traders, and through 
this channel affect share prices, as home country residents become more or less optimistic and 
trade accordingly.  It is well-established that “word-of-mouth” social interactions can affect 
sentiment and investment decisions (Shiller, 1984; Brown, Ivković, Smith and Weisbenner, 2008).  
Investors in different countries are not usually as geographically close to one another as the 
investors that Shiller and Brown et al investigated.  However, internet message boards have a 
global reach and there is evidence that they influence sentiment and trading (Sabherwal, Sarkar 
and Zhang, 2011).  Furthermore, foreign sentiment can become local where there is a relatively 
high proportion of foreign ownership of locally-listed stocks, as is the case in the UK.  At end-
2012, foreign investors owned 53.2% of the value of the UK stock market; of this, 48.3% was held 
by investors in North America
4
.  Investing is a global business, and it seems plausible that (for 
example) US fund managers based in the UK might be as ready to listen to their US counterparts 
as well as to their British colleagues in London.  Therefore, the hypothesis is that there may be 
direct contagion from sentiment in one country to sentiment in another, associated with an impact 
                                                 
4
 Office of National Statistics, Ownership of UK quoted shares 2012. www.statistics.gov.uk. 
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on share prices.   
 
In summary we make two contributions to the growing body of literature on investor sentiment by 
providing an empirical examination of sentiment in the UK.  One is that we construct new 
measures of UK investor sentiment using the first principle component method.  We build one 
index for overall market sentiment and a second for UK institutional investor sentiment.  The other 
is that we study the impact of investor sentiment on UK asset returns differentiating the analysis 
by company size, market states, and country in which sentiment originates (UK or US). 
 
Four key results of the paper are worth stating at the outset.  First, we find that UK sentiment is 
Granger-caused by US individual and institutional sentiment, but not the reverse.  Second, we find 
that when US and UK sentiment are included in the same regression, UK equity returns are 
significantly influenced by US individual and institutional sentiment and not at all by UK investor 
sentiment: suggesting that UK stock returns are affected by investor sentiment that is “born in the 
USA”.  This could be due to the high proportion of foreign investors holding UK shares as noted 
above, or to other factors, but it would certainly appear to warrant further investigation.  Third, 
sentiment tends to be a more important determinant of stock returns outside crisis periods than in a 
crisis.  This is consistent with previous evidence that, in a financial crisis, prices revert back to 
fundamentals, as they are no longer driven by sentiment.  Fourth, we find pervasive evidence that 
changes in sentiment contribute to market volatility, ceteris paribus.  The signs of lagged 
sentiment coefficients in stock return regressions suggest that investors invariably have “second 
thoughts”: if sentiment has a significant positive coefficient in the returns regression, lagged 
sentiment invariably has a significant negative and substantially offsetting coefficient, and vice-
versa.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the data used in the study 
including the new UK sentiment indices that we construct; in section 3 we examine the 
relationships, particularly the causal orderings, between UK investor sentiment on the one hand 
and US investor sentiment on the other; section 4 investigates how UK and US investor sentiment 
affect UK equity returns; section 5 contains some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Construction of the UK Sentiment Indices and Other Data 
 
The data making up the UK sentiment indices are weekly and cover the period 1
st
 January 1996 to 
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30
th
 June 2011.  Previous work suggests several variables that can be used as proxies for sentiment 
and we use eight underlying variables to construct the UK sentiment measures.  These are: the 
Advances to Declines ratio (AVDC), that is usually interpreted as a measure of market strength; 
the Closed-end Fund Discount (CFED), one of the earliest indicators of sentiment; the Money 
Flow Index (MFI), a momentum indicator; the Put-call Trading Volume ratio (PCV), a standard 
measure of bear-bull sentiment; the Put-call Open Interest ratio (PCO), which has been argued to 
be superior to PCV; the Relative Strength Index (RSI); Realized Volatility (VOLA); and Trading 
Volume (VRA).  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests show that these variables are all 
covariance-stationary apart from VRA (Table 1).  A further ADF test of the first difference of 
VRA (DVRA) shows that it is stationary.  Therefore, we construct the sentiment indices using 
DVRA and the levels of the remaining indicators.
5
   
 
 
                                                 
5
 Detailed definitions of these indicators are set out in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1: Statistics of Basic Data 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the basic data series.  The data are weekly and cover the period 1
st
 January 1996 to 30
th
 June 2011 (809 observations).  Exceptionally the 
SENTIX index is available only from 28
th
 February 2001 (532 observations). 
Variable definitions: 
AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: 
Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  VRA: Trading volume;  DVRA: first difference of Trading volume;  AAII: American Association of Individual Investors 
index;  II: American Investors Intelligence index;  SENTIX: German equity sentiment index;  Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock 
portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio. 
AC (1) is the autocorrelation coefficient at one lag. ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with maximum 52 lags.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Sum Sq. Dev. AC (1) ADF 
AVDC 1.0876 0.4549 1.2329 6.0842 525.589*** 167.2282 0.005 -28.3206*** 
CEFD 6.1710 1.9384 0.5394 4.4652 111.5912*** 3035.919 0.946*** -4.1802*** 
MFI 55.0233 23.520 -0.0673 2.3014 17.06343*** 446983.2 0.799*** -6.0015*** 
PCV 1.3526 0.4580 1.1055 6.3486 542.7550*** 169.5227 0.169*** -9.8230*** 
PCO 1.1830 0.1956 0.2522 2.1609 32.30725*** 30.90311 0.962*** -3.9491*** 
RSI 49.2066 25.7137 -0.4768 1.8330 76.4642*** 533584.7 0.872*** -7.9520*** 
VOLA 1.0117 0.6030 2.6823 14.4282 5372.483*** 293.8059 0.820*** -6.4611*** 
VRA 1.0261 0.1729 0.9335 7.7472 877.1272*** 24.1509 0.926*** -1.2628   
DVAR 0.000003 0.0663 0.4674 6.5852 462.1597*** 3.5507 0.512*** -10.2222*** 
AAII 0.1092 0.1933 -0.0893 2.7079 3.942019 30.1047 0.672*** -9.2572*** 
II 0.1863 0.1353 -0.7417 3.5538 84.51907*** 14.7866 0.939*** -5.9866*** 
Rbig 0.0575 2.4710 -0.3221 6.2673 373.8274*** 4933.496 -0.091*** -31.1141*** 
Rmid 0.1399 2.4603 -0.4941 5.6379 267.4875*** 4890.773 0.041 -27.2452*** 
Rsmall 0.0393 2.1286 -0.5987 6.9675 578.9446*** 3660.873 0.320*** -11.8891*** 
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Table 2 Pairwise correlations for variables used in the analysis  
Correlations use 806 observations from 17
th
 January 1996 to 29
th
 June 2011  
Variable definitions: 
AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call 
volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  VRA: 
Trading volume;  DVRA: first difference of Trading volume;  AAII: American Association of Individual Investors 
index;  II: American Investors Intelligence index  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level 
 
We first analyse the relation between the sentiment indicators and equity returns by regressing 
portfolio returns on the indicators.  It can be seen that AVDC, CEFD, MFI, PCV, RSI and VOLA 
all have some explanatory power over the return series, especially for large and small stocks 
(Table 3).  Overall, investor sentiment, as measured by these indicators, does have an identifiable 
impact on UK equity returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
 
AAII II AVDC CEFD DVRA MFI PCO PCV RSI VOLA 
AAII 1.000          
II 0.507*** 1.000         
AVDC 0.169*** 0.129*** 1.000        
CEFD -0.141*** -0.255*** 0.068* 1.000       
DVRA -0.019 -0.054 -0.094*** -0.034 1.000      
MFI 0.335*** 0.404*** 0.118*** -0.105*** -0.148*** 1.000     
PCO -0.136*** 0.167*** -0.001 -0.260*** 0.027 0.117*** 1.000    
PCV -0.129*** 0.092*** -0.085** -0.179*** -0.106*** -0.043 0.392*** 1.000   
RSI 0.427*** 0.545*** 0.030 -0.240*** -0.089** 0.626*** 0.124*** 0.020 1.000  
VOLA -0.330*** -0.566*** -0.187*** 0.466*** 0.075** -0.356*** -0.384*** -0.107*** -0.481*** 1.000 
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Table 3: Weekly regressions of returns on sentiment proxies  
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equations of the following form: 
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑖𝐴𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑖𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽3,𝑖𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽4,𝑖𝑃𝐶𝑉𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽5,𝑖𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 +
∑ 𝛽6,𝑖𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽7,𝑖𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽8,𝑖𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + 𝜀𝑡          
As there is some evidence of autocorrelation, the estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  
Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  
MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength 
Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference of Trading volume.  
Adj-R
2
: Adjusted R-squared;  S.E: Standard Error of regression;  AIC: Akaike information criterion. 
 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
AVDCt  3.4432*** 12.9305  4.0788*** 16.9843  2.7777*** 13.1468 
AVDCt-1 -0.2444  1.0828 -0.3132*  1.9511  0.1219  0.7094 
CEFDt  0.8736***  5.9081 -0.1070  0.9711 -0.2897**  2.1221 
CEFDt-1 -0.7786***  5.7406  0.2463**  2.4225  0.4053***  3.0120 
MFIt  0.0077*  1.7532  0.0064*  1.7621  0.0086**  2.2920 
MFIt-1 -0.0043  0.9901 -0.0010  0.2871 -0.0041  1.1311 
PCVt -0.4415**  2.5556 -0.0814  0.6431  0.0489  0.4187 
PCVt-1 -0.0902  0.5667  0.0950  1.0732  0.1808*  1.8086 
PCOt  1.5465  1.2046  0.3250  0.3455  0.4523  0.4743 
PCOt-1 -1.5666  1.2389 -1.3249  1.4625 -1.3547  1.5182 
RSIt  0.0067*  1.9095  0.0039  1.2023  0.0054*  1.9163 
RSIt-1 -0.0094***  2.7588 -0.0045  1.4008 -0.0050  1.5960 
VOLAt -1.3277***  4.5117 -1.1671***  3.7928 -1.1919***  5.2281 
VOLAt-1  0.6463*  2.4199  0.3758  1.4999  0.6600***  2.9629 
DVARt  0.0043  0.0037 -0.5206  0.5969  0.5249  0.6319 
DVARt-1  1.3602  1.2422  1.6919  1.5365  0.9365  0.7730 
Adj-R
2 0.6070 0.6945 0.5978 
S.E 1.5504 1.3612 1.3522 
F-Statistic 74.2508 115.5267 63.9601 
AIC 3.7370 3.4755 3.4659 
 
It can be argued that financial market indicators provide the most “objective” indicators of 
investor sentiment, as they are most closely linked to measurable activity in the financial markets.  
However, financial market decisions can be driven by a combination of an asset’s fundamentals 
and investor sentiment.  Therefore, when using sentiment proxies to explain asset returns, it is not 
necessarily clear whether the explanatory power of the proxies comes from their fundamental or 
their sentimental component.  The idea that financial market variables can be used as sentiment 
proxies is that they contain a factor corresponding to investor sentiment. The research consensus 
therefore is that this sentiment factor should be extracted from these proxy variables, rather than 
using the variables in their raw state.  Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker and Wurgler (2006) use 
the first principal component of several underlying sentiment proxies as their US investor 
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sentiment index.  We construct our UK market sentiment index by applying the same method.   
 
In the first stage, we calculate an Index by extracting the first principal component from 16 
variables: the eight proxy variables and their one-period lags.  According to Brown and Cliff 
(2004) and Baker and Wurgler (2006), the rationale for using current and lagged financial market 
data is that sentiment may be related to present information and also to the (recent) past, evolving 
somewhat in the manner of a filter, which the principal component method is intended to extract.  
In step two, we compute the correlation between Index and the current and lagged values of each 
of the proxies. Whichever has the higher correlation with the Index in each pair of current and 
lagged values is used in the final stage.  At this stage, we define the sentiment index, SENT, as 
the first principal component of the correlation matrix of the eight variables selected from step 
two.  This turns out to be: 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 0.2128𝐴𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑡−1 − 0.3655𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 0.4044𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑡−1 + 0.3273𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑡 +      
0.2128𝑃𝐶𝑉𝑡 + 0.4737𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡 − 0.5169𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑡−1 − 0.1165𝐷𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑡−1     …(1) 
The correlation between the 16-term 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 and the 8-term SENT is 0.98, indicating that little 
information is lost in dropping the eight terms with different time subscripts.  SENT explains 32% 
of the sample variance suggesting that one factor captures a significant part of the common 
variation.  SENT is interpreted as a measure of UK market-wide investor sentiment, since it is 
extracted from variables that are generally seen as broad indicators of investor sentiment. 
 
We turn next to a sentiment index representing “informed” institutional investors.  For this we 
argue that sentiment proxies related to derivatives trading are likely to be most representative of 
institutional sentiment because institutional investors are more likely to be dominant in the 
derivatives markets (Brown and Cliff, 2004).  We use a subset of sentiment variables, PCO, PCV 
and VOLA, to construct the institutional sentiment index (SENT
P
).  Using the same method as for 
SENT, SENT
P
 is given by: 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑝 = 0.6492𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑡 + 0.5344𝑃𝐶𝑉𝑡 − 0.5412𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑡−1         …(2) 
The first principal component of SENT
P 
explains 55% of the sample variance showing that one 
factor captures much of the common variation.  However, since PCOt, PCVt and VOLAt-1 are used 
in the construction of the market and institutional sentiment indices, this may lead to a problem of 
overlapping between the two indices.  To examine this, a further index (SENT
X
) is constructed by 
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excluding PCOt, PCVt and VOLAt-1 from the calculation of SENT.  This is: 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑋 = 0.3742𝐴𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑡−1 − 0.2743𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 0.5682𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑡−1 + 0.6443𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡 − 0.2163𝐷𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 …(3) 
The first principal component of SENT
X
 explains 37% of the sample variance.  The correlation 
coefficient between SENT
X
 and SENT is 0.9997.  The relation between the two indices is 
therefore very close to one-for-one.  This suggests that irrespective of whether the market 
sentiment index is constructed including or excluding the three institutional proxies, the outcomes 
are very similar.  We conclude that there is no problem of overlapping between the indices, SENT 
and SENT
P
. 
 
Figure 1: UK market investor sentiment index and institutional sentiment index, 1996 – 
2011 
 
 
The two sentiment indices, SENT and SENT
P
, are both relatively persistent, but they are only 
moderately correlated with one another, suggesting that they do provide independent measures of 
investor sentiment. See Figure 1 and table 4. Table 4 also reports the correlation coefficients 
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between SENT and SENT
P
 and the component proxy variables.  SENT
P
 has high correlation with 
all its components, and also has strong correlation with several non-component indicators, 
notably CEFD.  CEFD is normally thought of as an indicator for individual investor sentiment 
rather than institutional sentiment.  The higher correlation between CEFD and SENT
P
 than 
between CEFD and SENT may be attributable to the importance of institutions in the UK market 
(Ammer, 1990).  This echoes the correlation test result shown in Table 3, suggesting that CEFD 
has stronger correlation to the institutional sentiment, II, than to the individual sentiment, AAII. 
Apart from CEFD, SENT has a higher correlation with the pure market sentiment indicators (i.e. 
all except PCOt, PCVt, VOLAt-1) than does SENT
P
, and a lower correlation than SENT
P
 with the 
institutional indicators: PCOt, PCVt, VOLAt-1.  This suggests that the components extracted for 
SENT and SENT
P
 do capture sentiment from different groups of investors.  Granger causality 
tests between SENT and SENT
P
 (Table 4 Panel C) suggest that there is bi-directional causality 
and therefore no strong indication that either group of investors tends to lead market sentiment in 
the UK.  
 
 
3. UK and foreign investor sentiment  
As financial markets are internationally integrated, investor sentiment may be internationally 
correlated.  Becjann et al. (2011) use survey-based indices whereas Baker et al. (2012) and Bai 
(2014) used composed indices to examine cross-border contagion of investor sentiment. 
Contagion may be due to common (international) information used in forming sentiment in 
different countries, or equally to investors’ herding across borders.  However, a change of 
sentiment in one country may lead to a change in another country regardless of how sentiment is 
measured in different countries. We therefore use the UK composed indices, SENT and SENT
P
, 
and US survey- based indices, AAI and II, to investigate the relation between UK and US 
investor sentiment.       
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Table 4: Properties of UK Investor Sentiment Indices  
Panel A reports summary statistics of the constructed investor sentiment indexes: UK market sentiment (SENT) and UK institutional sentiment (SNETP) 
Panel B shows pairwise correlation coefficients. 
Panel C shows p-values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests 
Variable definitions: 
SENT: UK market sentiment; SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment; AVDC: Advances to declines ratio;  CEFD: Closed-end Fund Discount;  MFI: Money Flow Index;  PCV: Put-
call volume ratio;  PCO: Put-call open interest ratio;  RSI: Relative Strength Index;  VOLA: Realized volatility;  DVRA: first difference of Trading volume. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with a maximum of 52 lags. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Panel A: Statistical summary of Weekly sentiment indices 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF 
Autocorrelations at lags 1-5 
1 2 3 4 5 
SENT 50.1432 26.1439 -0.4746 1.8324 76.1325*** -7.954*** 0.872*** 0.733*** 0.595*** 0.475*** 0.356*** 
SENT
P
 0.9436 0.5187 -0.8072 5.2046 251.3766*** -4.9581*** 0.708*** 0.686*** 0.647*** 0.632*** 0.561*** 
Panel B:  Investor sentiment correlation coefficients 
 SENTt SENT
P
t AVDCt CEFDt MFIt PCVt PCOt RSIt VOLAt DVARt 
AVDCt-1  0.3112***  0.0912***  0.0046 -0.0278  0.2697*** -0.0623*  0.0102  0.3619*** -0.0618* -0.2099*** 
CEFDt -0.2595*** -0.4659***  0.0694**  1 -0.1056*** -0.1742*** -0.2576*** -0.2413*** -0.0658*  0.4667*** 
MFIt-1  0.8014***  0.2961***  0.0052 -0.1413***  0.8003***  0.0822**  0.1323***  0.5903*** -0.1294*** -0.3166*** 
PCVt  0.0564  0.6808*** -0.0834** -0.1742*** -0.0437  1  0.3932***  0.0182 -0.1118*** -0.1055*** 
PCOt  0.1540***  0.6835***  0.0002 -0.2576***  0.1158***  0.3932***  1  0.1227*** -0.2040*** -0.3827*** 
RSIt  0.9550***  0.3600***  0.0290 -0.2413***  0.6262***  0.0182  0.1227*** 1 -0.1433*** -0.4810*** 
VOLAt-1 -0.5283*** -0.8123*** -0.0393  0.5093*** -0.3466*** -0.1788*** -0.4020*** -0.5106***  0.1594***  0.8201*** 
DVARt-1 -0.1391*** -0.0767** -0.0068 -0.0176 -0.1166*** -0.0651 -0.0103  0.1159***  1  0.0584* 
SENTt  1  0.3967***         
Panel C: Granger causality tests of SENT 
 SENT
P
 
 SENT does not Granger Cause SENT
P
 SENT
P
 does not Granger Cause SENT 
SENT <0.0001 0.0072 
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Table 5: Correlation and Granger causality tests: UK and foreign investor sentiment 
Panel A shows pairwise correlation coefficients among different sentiment indices. 
Panel B shows p-values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests as between either of the UK indices 
(SENT or SENT
P
) and any one of the US (AAII or II) 
Test 1: H0: Granger-noncausality from the US index to the UK index. 
Test 2: H0: Granger-noncausality from the UK index to the US index. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT is UK market sentiment; SENT
P
 is UK institutional sentiment; 
AAII is American Association of Individual Investors index; II is American Investors Intelligence index. 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 SENTP SENT AAII II 
SENT
P 1.000000    
SENT 0.3967*** 1.000000   
AAII 0.0850*** 0.4113*** 1.000000  
II 0.4352*** 0.5554*** 0.5066*** 1.000000 
Panel B: Granger causality tests 
 AAII II 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
SENT <0.0001 0.9058 <0.0001 0.4826 
SENT
P <0.0001 0.3161 <0.0001 0.4701 
 
 
As an hypothesis, we would expect that home investors, whether institutions or individuals, have 
less knowledge about foreign markets than about home markets, and that they would therefore be 
more likely to pay attention to foreign institutional (“expert”) sentiment than to general foreign 
market sentiment.  However, it might also be argued that market sentiment is more easily 
observable than institutional sentiment.  In fact, UK institutional sentiment (SENT
P
) is more 
strongly correlated with US institutional sentiment (II) than with US individual sentiment (AAII); 
UK market sentiment (SENT) is also more highly correlated with II than with AAII (Table 5 
panel A).  Granger-causality tests (Table 5 panel B) provide strong evidence that AAII and II 
each Granger-cause SENT and SENT
P
, but SENT and SENT
P
 do not Granger-cause any of AAII 
and II.  This clearly suggests that US investors’ sentiment does tend to lead UK investor 
sentiment, but not vice versa.  
 
Next we regress the UK sentiment indices on the US indices to investigate how far foreign 
investor sentiment directly affects UK investor sentiment. The basic model is: 
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𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐾 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝐾
4
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑡                    … (4) 
Here, SENTt
K
 = UK market sentiment, or institutional sentiment (K=P). 
 
The estimates (Table 6) suggest that UK institutional and market sentiment are both strongly 
persistent even when controlling for the impact of changes in foreign sentiment.  Changes in US 
individual and institutional sentiment each have an immediate effect on both UK market and 
institutional sentiment.  Both the signs and lag structures of these effects do however differ 
between the US effects within each equation, and for the same variable across equations.  Tests of 
size of impact (γi = δi) within equations suggest that there are differences between the size of 
impact of US individual and institutional sentiment.  However, perhaps the most interesting 
feature of all these results is that there is strong evidence of an apparent partial reversal in the 
effect of foreign sentiment: a “second thoughts” effect.  We can see this most clearly in the 
SENT
P
 equation, where the current impact of AAII (γ0) is –0.2811 while the lagged effect (γ1) is 
+0.3704, producing a much smaller total effect of 0.0896.  Of course, the level of sentiment 
cannot easily be normalised on any particular metric, and so the exact magnitude of any specific 
coefficient does not have a precise interpretation.  It is the signs and relative magnitudes of 
coefficients on the same variable when compared across different lags that is of interest here.  
This can be interpreted as a reversal effect, perhaps reflecting second thoughts by home investors 
about changes in foreign sentiment.  We can see that the sign reversals occur in all the foreign 
sentiment effects where the effect persists over more than a single week.  Clearly, if the 
immediate impact of foreign sentiment changes is to induce UK investors to trade, then “second 
thoughts” may well induce trade reversals in the subsequent week(s), increasing UK stock market 
volatility as a result.  In summary, foreign sentiment does have direct effects on UK sentiment, 
even after controlling for the autocorrelation in the sentiment variables themselves, and there 
appears to be a significant reversal or “second thoughts” component to these effects. 
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Table 6: Regression analysis of UK sentiment measures on foreign sentiment indices  
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equations of the general form:  
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐾 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝐾4
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡       
Insignificant variables were deleted from the model only where this did not produce unacceptable spikes in the 
estimated lag structure. The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors for residual serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
 
Variable definitions: 
SENT
K
 = UK market sentiment (K=M), or institutional sentiment (K=P); AAII: American Association of Individual 
Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; Fi, i = 1,…,4, are F tests for the quantitative effects of US 
general and market sentiment: F1: γ1=δ1; F2: γ0=δ0; F3: |γ1|=δ1; F4: γ2=δ2 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
SENT  SENT
P
 
 Coef. t-Stat   Coef. t-Stat 
AAIIt 7.5319** 2.3604  AAIIt –0.2811*** 3.7141 
AAIIt-1 16.408*** 5.0958  AAIIt-1 0.3704*** 4.0184 
AAIIt-2 –13.896*** 4.1477  AAIIt-2 0.0523 0.6224 
IIt 12.9537 1.2224  AAIIt-3 –0.1571* 1.7043 
IIt-1 48.2156*** 3.8502  AAIIt-4 0.0648 0.8513 
IIt-2 –25.2721* 1.6831  IIt 0.5006*** 3.1315 
IIt-3 –6.5870 0.5107  SENT
P
t-1 0.3182*** 6.4143 
IIt-4 –24.2740*** 3.0110  SENT
P
t-2 0.2301*** 6.5695 
SENTt-1 0.8220*** 44.681  SENT
P
t-3 0.1154*** 3.2100 
Adj. R
2 0.8078   SENT
P
t-4 0.1488*** 3.4082 
S.E. 11.4846   Adj. R
2 0.6209  
AIC 7.7323   S.E. 0.3204  
F1 6.3915***   AIC 0.5752  
F2 0.2010   F1   
F3    F2 15.850***  
F4 0.5387   F3 1.8852  
 
4. Investor sentiment and equity returns  
 
To study the impact of sentiment on UK stock returns we classify UK Equities into three 
portfolios according to market capitalisation.  The FTSE 100 Index is used to represent prices of 
the large stocks, and the return, Rbig, computed accordingly.  The FTSE 250 represents prices of 
mid-size stocks, with return, Rmid.  The FTSE Small Cap Index is used for small stocks, with 
return, Rsml.  Table 1 contains summary statistics for all these variables.  
 
Table 3 shows that some of the UK sentiment proxies have statistically significant explanatory 
power over UK equity returns.  However, prima facie, it is not clear whether this is due to the 
sentimental or fundamental components of the proxies.  Since SENT and SENT
P
 are extracted 
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from these proxies, they are less likely to contain fundamental components and therefore to be a 
better representation of sentiment per se.  Next therefore we study the relationship between UK 
equity returns and the indices of UK and foreign sentiment.  We concentrate on US and UK 
sentiment to exploit the longer data sample and the distinction between US individual and 
investor sentiment. 
 
Table 7: Correlation and Granger causality test for stock returns and investor sentiment 
Panel A shows pairwise correlation coefficients between sentiment indices and different size UK stock portfolios. 
Panel B gives p-values for the F statistics from bilateral Granger causality tests as between the sentiment indices and 
the returns on different size UK stock portfolios.  
Test 1: 𝐻0: Granger-noncausality from stock returns to the sentiment index. 
Test 2: 𝐻0: Granger-noncausality from sentiment index to stock returns. 
Variable definitions: 
SENT: UK market sentiment; SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment; AAII: American Association of Individual 
Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index; SENTIX: German equity sentiment index. Rbig: return on 
the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio.  
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
Panel A: Correlation tests 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
SENT
P -0.0094 0.0917*** 0.2563*** 
SENT -0.0511 0.0015 0.0635* 
AAII 0.2059*** 0.2629*** 0.3403*** 
II 0.1191*** 0.2020*** 0.2771*** 
Panel B: Granger causality tests 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
SENT
P <0.0001 0.8899 <0.0001 0.7713 <0.0001 0.8345 
SENT <0.0001 0.8747 <0.0001 0.4804 <0.0001 0.4306 
AAII <0.0001 0.6950 <0.0001 0.4628 <0.0001 0.2980 
II 0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 <0.0001 0.0167 <0.0001 
 
 
Correlation tests for the returns on the three UK stock portfolios and for UK and US sentiment 
indices are shown in table 7.  Strikingly, there is only limited evidence of any contemporaneous 
correlation between UK sentiment and UK stock returns, and that is for small and mid-sized 
stocks, but there is stronger evidence that UK returns are correlated with US sentiment for all 
three stock portfolios.  Empirical studies of the bi-directional relation of investor sentiment and 
returns provide rather mixed suggestions. Some indicate that investor sentiment has strong 
predictive power over stock returns (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, Beaumont et al. 2005, 
Bandopadhyaya and Jones, 2008, Schmeling, 2009). Others show that sentiment itself is caused 
by returns (Subrahmanyan, 2005, Wang et al. 2006). Estimating bivariate VAR models, we test 
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for Granger-causality between sentiment and returns
6
. Bivariate Granger causality tests show that 
there is one-way causality from either UK or US sentiment to UK stock returns, irrespective of 
portfolio size.  The only exception is US institutional sentiment, where there is bidirectional 
causality with all three stock portfolios.  We turn next to formal regression models of UK returns 
on UK and US sentiment, beginning with UK sentiment: SENT and SENT
P
.  
 
4.1 UK investor sentiment and Equity returns 
DeLong, et al (1990), Daniel et al (1998), and Odean (1998) suggest that psychological bias leads 
to noise traders’ misperceptions that in turn cause asset price fluctuations. Overconfident 
investors overreact to private information and drive stock prices away from fundamentals, and 
confidence will be affected by feedback from the outcome. We therefore hypothesize that 
investor sentiment may have an immediate effect on stock returns, and stock returns may affect 
sentiment by the feedback effect. Brown and Cliff(2004) and Wang et al. (2006) show this 
feedback effect of stock returns in a VAR frame work.  Granger causality (Table 7) also provides 
one test of this hypothesis.  
 
Here, we consider a more general model of the impact of UK sentiment on UK stock returns.  
This includes both UK institutional and market sentiment and allows for a contemporaneous 
effect of sentiment on stock returns: 
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑛
𝑖=0
+ 𝜀𝑡                                                … (5) 
where size = big, mid or sml, and we begin with n=4 lags, testing down by deleting insignificant 
variables only where this does not produce unacceptable spikes in the estimated lag structure. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Variable series are suggested to be stationary by ADF and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) method, ADF test 
statistics are reported in Table 1 and Table 4. KPSS test results are available by request.     
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Table 8: Regression of returns on UK sentiment indexes 
Table 8 reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡−𝑗
4
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑝2
𝑖=0 + 𝜀𝑡           
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors for residual serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  
Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment. 
?̅?𝟐: the Adjusted R-squared; S.E: Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion;  LM: 
Breusch/Godfrey LM test for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity. Fi, i = 1,…,3, are 
F tests for the quantitative effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment: F1: β0 = γ0; F2: β1 = γ1; F3: 
|β1| = |γ1| 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
α0 -0.1329 0.4055 -0.1109 0.3029 -0.3897 1.1355 
Rt-1 -0.1620*** 2.0951    0.2378*** 4.0842 
Rt-2 -0.0519 1.0510     
Rt-3 -0.0253 0.5036     
Rt-4 -0.0856* 1.7942     
SENTt  0.0234** 2.2361   0.0135**  1.9907  0.0205*** 3.0320 
SENTt-1 -0.0152* 1.6779 -0.0040 0.6409 -0.0084 1.5366 
SENT
P
 t -0.2932 0.7840 -0.0767 0.2104 -0.1804 0.7139 
SENT
P
 t-1  0.0777 0.2171   0.2722 0.9230  0.4297* 1.8673 
SENT
P
 t-2   -0.4350 1.4661 -0.4485* 1.9110 
Adj. R
2  0.0129    0.0077   0.1208  
S.E.  2.4598    2.4548   1.9991  
AIC  4.6492    4.6414   4.2319  
LM  1.0819    1.6281***   1.6552***  
ARCH 55.0853***  55.0461***  39.9187***  
F1  0.7104    0.0613   0.6408  
F2  0.0673     3.5785*  
F3      3.3520*  
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The results suggest that UK sentiment does have an effect on UK stock returns but the 
institutional effect is relatively weak (Table 8).  Market sentiment clearly has a significant 
contemporaneous effect on the returns of all three size-based portfolios.  However, the (just) 
significant effect of institutional sentiment is confined to small stocks.  One might anticipate that 
institutional sentiment would have a stronger effect than market sentiment on smaller stocks, 
because institutions would be expected to have an information advantage for less well-known 
companies.  However, in these results, the significant impact of institutional sentiment is confined 
exclusively to small stocks and, in any event, is less significant than market sentiment. We also 
see some evidence of “second thoughts”, with coefficients on lagged sentiment having the 
opposite sign to those on current sentiment, although many of these reversals are barely 
significant.  
 
To investigate these findings more closely, we pursue the argument that investor sentiment is 
more likely to influence decisions during periods of market stress, especially around times of 
financial crisis (Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed, 2004), or economic crisis (Chung, Hung and Yeh, 
2012).  The sample period of 1996-2011 has experienced several major economic and financial 
crises.  We investigate whether sentiment has a different effect in crisis times by dividing the 
sample into three sub-samples: non-crisis periods, pre-crisis periods, and in-crisis periods.  See 
appendix 2 for full details of these sub-samples.  We then regress portfolio returns on SENT and 
SENT
P
 as before, using interacting dummies to identify separate slope coefficients for each sub-
sample corresponding to the different market states of normal, pre-crisis and in-crisis (Table 9). 
 
It can be seen that the effect of sentiment in this model is less uniformly significant, appearing at 
different lags within the different periods.  There is continued evidence of sign-reversal in the 
time effects of sentiment, although several of these coefficients are not significant.  It seems clear 
that sentiment has little significant impact on returns in crisis periods (apart from on small stocks), 
but does tend to be more significant in normal and more especially in pre-crisis periods.  The pre-
crisis periods when we find sentiment to have the most impact are those in which stock prices 
rose sharply on a wave of optimism corresponding to a bubble effect.  Thus our results provide 
some support to some earlier findings that sentiment tends to have its strongest impact on stock 
prices during up-markets when investors are optimistic.  The absence of sentiment effects during 
in-crisis periods is consistent with the thesis that a financial crisis is typically a process by which 
prices revert back to fundamentals as they are no longer driven by sentiment (Cooper, Gutierrez 
and Hameed, 2004; Chung, Hung and Yeh, 2012).   
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In a parallel manner we can investigate the impact of investor sentiment on stock returns under 
different market sentiment conditions.  To do this, we define weeks of high sentiment as those 
when sentiment is above its sample mean ( 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐾 > 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐾̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅;  𝐾 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑃) , or low 
sentiment when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐾 < 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐾̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅.  We then regress our portfolio returns on SENT and SENTP 
once again, using interacting dummies to identify separate slope coefficients for each sub-sample 
corresponding to the different market sentiment conditions (Table 10).  We see that market and 
institutional sentiment are never significant when overall market sentiment is low.  However, 
when market sentiment is high, there is some evidence of an impact of sentiment: on large and to 
a lesser extent on small stocks.  As sentiment tends to be greater in up-markets these results 
provide further, indirect, support for the argument that sentiment matters more in rising markets. 
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Table 9: Regression of returns on UK sentiment indexes under financial crisis conditions 
Table 9 reports the results of regressions of the following form: 
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼1
1𝐷1 + 𝛼2
1𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑝2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷1 + 𝛼1
2𝐷2 + 𝛼2
2𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑃2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷2 + 𝛼1
3𝐷3 + 𝛼2
3𝑅𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
3𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷3 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
3𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑝2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷3 + 𝜀𝑡           
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors for residual serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market 
sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment.  D1 = 1 in non-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D2 = 1 in pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise;  D3 = 1 in in-crisis periods and zero 
otherwise.  The pre- and in-crisis periods are as defined in Appendix 2.  The no-crisis periods consist of the remaining observations in the sample.  The total number of observation is 
809: 183 weeks fall in pre-crisis period, 147 weeks are in-crisis and 479 weeks are normal. 
T statistics are shown in parentheses.  Fi, i = 1,…,3, are F tests for the quantitative effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment: F1: β0 = γ0; F2: 𝛾2 = 𝛽2; F3: β1 = γ1. 
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
Normal 
period 
pre-crisis 
period 
in-crisis 
period 
α1 
-0.0918 
(0.2482) 
 1.7738*** 
(3.2219) 
 1.1782 
(1.3790) 
-0.2892 
(0.6369) 
 1.4424** 
(2.3399) 
 0.7117 
(0.8129) 
-0.5482 
(1.1786) 
 0.9451 
(1.5912) 
 0.3679 
(0.5281) 
Rt-1 
-0.1228 
(1.2993) 
-0.1577** 
(1.9680) 
-0.2925** 
(2.1323) 
-0.0161 
(0.2090) 
 0.2290** 
(2.4943) 
-0.1325 
(1.6151) 
 0.1892** 
(2.4600) 
 0.3737*** 
(3.4853) 
 0.2879*** 
(3.4333) 
SENTt 
 0.0148 
(1.1644) 
 0.0095 
(0.6973) 
 0.0324 
(1.5041) 
 0.0201* 
(1.6757) 
-0.0232* 
(1.7826) 
 0.0156 
(0.9537) 
 0.0311*** 
(3.2240) 
-0.0055 
(0.5747) 
 0.0020 
(0.1381) 
SENTt-1 
-0.0229 
(1.6053) 
-0.0029 
(0.1966) 
-0.0227 
(0.9496) 
-0.0205 
(1.4786) 
 0.0414** 
(2.5095) 
-0.0049 
(0.2098) 
-0.0199** 
(1.9677) 
 0.0136 
(1.2098) 
 0.0123 
(0.6089) 
SENTt-2 
 0.0146* 
(1.6692) 
-0.0160 
(1.5282) 
-0.0230 
(1.6316) 
 0.0141 
(1.5445) 
-0.0230** 
(2.1772) 
-0.0183 
(1.0649) 
 0.0041 
(0.5885) 
-0.0090 
(0.9634) 
-0.0155 
(1.1190) 
SENT
P
 t 
-0.0857 
(0.1650) 
-0.9260** 
(2.2148) 
-0.9462 
(1.1341) 
 0.2254 
(0.4543) 
-0.5125 
(1.2354) 
-0.7694 
(1.2070) 
 0.0561 
(0.1640) 
-0.4181 
(1.1464) 
-0.9314* 
(1.8576) 
SENT
P
 t-1 
 0.0262 
(0.0515) 
-0.1437 
(0.3167) 
-0.4246 
(0.4236) 
 0.4773 
(1.1717) 
-0.8106* 
(1.7775) 
-0.0048 
(0.0082) 
 0.5732* 
(1.7441) 
-0.3880 
(1.2523) 
 0.2731 
(0.5752 
SENT
P
 t-2 
-0.1428 
(0.3153) 
 0.3279 
(0.7739) 
 0.1827 
(0.3329) 
-0.9180** 
(1.9791) 
 0.5483 
(1.4453) 
-0.2471 
(0.5195) 
-0.7901** 
(2.2030) 
 0.2191 
(0.6760) 
-0.2912 
(1.2912) 
F1     0.1708  1.3727   0.0054   3.4987* 
F2  0.1201    4.0034**  2.2241   4.8884**   0.6862 
F3      3.3725*   3.2096**   0.2980 
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Table 10: Regression of returns on UK sentiment indexes under different market sentiment conditions s 
Table 10 reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼1
1𝐷1 + 𝛼2
1𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑝2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷1 + 𝛼1
2𝐷2 + 𝛼2
2𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑃2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷2 + 𝛼1
3𝐷3 + 𝛼2
3𝑅𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
3𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷3 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
3𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑝2
𝑖=0 ∗ 𝐷3 + 𝜀𝑡           
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors for residual serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market 
sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment.  D1 = 1 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 > 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   and zero otherwise; D2 = 1 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 < 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and zero otherwise. 
Fi, i = 1,…,3, are F tests for the asymmetric effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment: in different market conditions. F1: 𝛽0
1 = 𝛽0
2, where 𝛽0
1 is 𝛽0 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 >
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝛽0
2 is 𝛽0 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 < 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . F2: 𝛽1
1 = 𝛽1
2, where 𝛽1
1 is 𝛽1 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 > 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝛽1
2 is 𝛽1 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 < 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . F3: 𝛾2
1 = 𝛾2
2, where 𝛾2
1 is 𝛾2 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 >
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝛾2
2 is 𝛾2 when 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 < 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  Fj, i = 4,…,6, are F tests for the quantitative effects of UK market sentiment and institutional sentiment when market sentiment is high: 
F4: 𝛽0
1 = 𝛾0
1; F5: 𝛽1
1 = 𝛾1
1; F6: 𝛽2
1 = 𝛾2
1.    
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒕 > 𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒕 < 𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒕 > 𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒕 < 𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒕 > 𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒕 < 𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
α0  0.1472 0.2204  0.1188 0.3115  0.2389 0.3457 -0.1635 0.3483  0.0881 0.1591 -0.5095 0.9801 
Rt-1 -0.2272*** 3.0123 -0.1065 1.0421 -0.1212 1.4419  0.0488 0.6354  0.1748* 1.8236  0.2623*** 2.7158 
SENTt  0.0288** 2.1894  0.0124 0.6580  0.0208 1.3402  0.0096 0.5745  0.0212* 1.8084  0.0231 1.4938 
SENTt-1 -0.0292*** 2.6762 -0.0089 0.5632 -0.0142 1.0270 -0.0006 0.0411 -0.0156 1.6162 -0.0028 0.2122 
SENTt-2  0.0047 0.6118 -0.0012 0.1225  0.0014 0.1739  0.0028 0.2504  0.0029 0.4549 -0.0034 0.3842 
SENT
P
 t -0.5775 1.5870 -0.2502 0.3997 -0.3545 1.0887  0.0689 0.1222 -0.2650 1.1075 -0.2107 0.4862 
SENT
P
 t-1 -0.0112 0.0269  0.0736 0.1005  0.2868 1.0470  0.2626 0.4765  0.2417 1.1036  0.6011 1.5401 
SENT
P
 t-2  0.2973 1.0903  0.0086 0.0157 -0.3350 1.1942 -0.5450 1.0521 -0.3640* 1.6697 -0.5090 1.2648 
F1 0.5357 0.2593 0.0098 
F2 1.1862   
F3   0.1013 
F4 2.7873*  1.4026 
F5 0.0019  1.3605 
F6 1.1427  2.8191* 
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4.2 UK Equity returns and foreign investor sentiment  
 
In the final section we look more directly at the impact of US sentiment on UK stock returns.  We 
regress the portfolio returns on US and UK sentiment indexes: 
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡−𝑗
4
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑃4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 +
𝜀𝑡…(6) 
The results seem to us to be striking (Table 11).  First, once AAII and II are included in the 
regressions both UK sentiment variables become insignificant.  This is true for all three portfolios: 
small, mid-size and large.  This suggests that, although UK sentiment has a proximate influence 
on UK stock returns, it is not the ultimate source of that influence.  To identify a more 
fundamental source we turn to the coefficients on US sentiment.  Here we see that US individual 
sentiment is strongly significant in helping to explain the returns on all three portfolios: small, 
mid-size and large.  US institutional sentiment is also highly significant in explaining the returns 
on all three portfolios, although the lag structure of the significant coefficients is one or two 
weeks longer than for the effects of US individual sentiment.  However, US institutional 
sentiment appears to have a larger quantitative impact than does US individual sentiment.  These 
results, together with those reported above for Granger causality and the returns regressions 
including only UK sentiment, strongly suggest that the effect that UK sentiment has on UK stock 
returns is largely driven by US investor sentiment.  That is, UK stock returns are influenced by 
UK investor sentiment only to the extent that UK sentiment is itself moved by US sentiment.  UK 
sentiment does not have an impact on returns that is independent of the effects that are 
transmitted via US investor sentiment.   In other words we can say that, in our sample, UK 
investor sentiment is “born in the USA”. 
 
A further striking feature of this last set of results is the presence of sign reversals among the 
coefficients of all the sentiment measures.  These reversals are consistent with the argument that 
sentiment contributes directly to volatility in portfolio returns: if buoyant sentiment contributes to 
increased returns in any given week this tends to be followed by reduced returns in the 
succeeding week(s). 
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Table 11: Regression of returns on UK and US sentiment indexes 
Table 11 reports the results of regressions of the following general form: 
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑡−𝑗
4
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑖
𝑃4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=0 + 𝜀𝑡    
The estimation method is OLS with Newey-West standard errors for residual serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Variable definitions: 
size = big, mid or sml; so, Rbig: return on the large-size stock portfolio;  Rmid: return on mid-size stock portfolio;  
Rsmall: return on small-size stock portfolio;  SENT: UK market sentiment;  SENT
P
: UK institutional sentiment; ; 
AAII: American Association of Individual Investors index; II: American Investors Intelligence index.  
R
2
: Adjusted R-squared; S.E: Standard Error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion. LM: Breusch/Godfrey 
LM test for residual autocorrelation; ARCH: ARCH test for Heteroskadasticity. 
Fi, i = 1,…,3, are F tests for the quantitative effects of  market sentiment and institutional sentiment: F1: δ0 = θ0; F2: 
δ1 = θ1; F3:  δ2 = θ2.  
***Statistical significance at 1% level; **Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 Rbig Rmid Rsml 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
α0 -0.4475 1.5391 -0.2855 0.8792 -0.3225 1.0527 
Rt-1 -0.2322*** 4.3521    0.1740*** 3.5123 
Rt-2 -0.1153** 2.5633    0.0979** 2.3197 
Rt-3 -0.0971** 2.3805    0.1078 1.5603 
Rt-4 -0.1017** 2.2285   -0.0765* 1.8243 
SENTt  0.0064 1.2066  0.0008 0.2207  0.0036 0.9739 
SENT
P
 t -0.0586 0.2520 -0.1351 0.5927 -0.0875 0.3886 
SENT
P
 t-1      0.2257 1.0650 
SENT
P
 t-2     -0.3293 1.5352 
AAIIt  4.0103*** 6.0382  3.8361*** 5.1932  3.1935*** 5.4831 
AAIIt-1 -3.3533*** 5.7636 -3.1409*** 4.2974 -2.0525*** 3.2092 
AAIIt-2     -1.4408** 2.2948 
AAIIt-3      1.1020* 1.8083 
IIt 13.6888*** 6.8353 11.8334*** 6.2330  7.5338*** 4.8302 
IIt-1 -6.7411** 2.0047 -4.1114 1.2605 -0.1842 0.0763 
IIt-2 -1.8130 0.7303 -5.3677** 2.4268 -5.9423*** 2.9877 
IIt-3  0.0155 0.0056     
IIt-4 -4.0696** 2.5140     
R
2
 0.1831 0.1564 0.2474 
S.E. 2.2388 2.2662 1.8560 
AIC 4.4670 4.4840 4.0945 
LM  1.3500*       1.7945*** 1.1823 
ARCH    57.3004***    60.2359***     18.8388*** 
F1   18.9172***    18.9172***    4.7956** 
F2 0.9652 0.9652  3.3055* 
F3        8.1400*** 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The goal of this paper was to investigate the effect of foreign and local components of investor 
sentiment on UK equity returns.  First, we construct two new indices to measure UK market-wide 
and institutional investor sentiment.  The UK market-wide index is not the first such index for the 
UK, but it is more comprehensive and at a higher frequency than previous such indices.  Our UK 
institutional index is one of the very few composed indices which directly measure institutional 
investor sentiment distinct from the market and it is the first such for the UK.  Second, we 
examine the relationship between UK composed sentiment indices on one hand and US survey-
base investor sentiment on the other.  We find that UK sentiment is Granger-caused by US 
sentiment, but not the reverse. It also suggests that if different sentiment factors are caught by 
different methods, they also pass through the border due to the herding instinct of noise traders. 
Third, we study the impact of UK and US sentiment on UK stock returns across different market 
states.  Here we find several interesting results.  First, sentiment tends to be a more important 
determinant of stock returns outside crisis periods.  This is consistent with previous evidence that, 
in a financial crisis, prices revert back to fundamentals as they are no longer driven by sentiment.  
Second, we find pervasive evidence of “second thoughts” or return reversals in the impact of 
sentiment on returns.  If a particular shock to sentiment is currently associated with increased 
returns, ceteris paribus, then its effect in the subsequent week(s) is to reduce returns.  This 
provides tentative evidence for the argument that sentiment-driven returns may be volatile on a 
small scale as well as in the large in connection with the sources of financial crises.  Fourth we 
find that when US and UK sentiment are used in the same regressions to explain UK stock 
returns, US sentiment drives out UK sentiment: US sentiment variables are highly significant 
whereas UK sentiment variables are not significant at all.  This would suggest that UK sentiment 
may be “born in the USA”. 
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Appendix 1:  Definition of the UK sentiment proxies 
 
Advances-Declines Ratio (AVDC): This is usually thought of as a “Market Strength” indicator, 
and is given by the ratio of the number of rising stocks rising to the number of declining stocks in 
the market.  Brown and Cliff (2004) and Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006) use a modification of 
AVDC as a sentiment proxy to construct their investor sentiment index.   
 
Closed-end Fund Discount (CEFD): The CEFD is one of the earliest indicators of market 
sentiment (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991) and it has been widely used as a proxy to measure 
investor sentiment, for example, Brown, 1999, Brown & Cliff, 2004, and Baker & Wurgler, 2006.   
We calculate the discount from 129 closed-end investment trusts listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, using daily prices and Datastream-estimated Net Asset Values (NAV).  The value-
weighted discount of Lee et al (1991) is applied for the computation.  They constructed a value-
weighted index of discounts (CEFD): 
𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1                     
where:  𝑊𝑖 =
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
,      𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡−𝑆𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡
× 100, 𝑆𝑃𝑖 = 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡      
and nt is the number of funds with available DISCi,t and NAVi,t data at the end of period t. 
 
Money Flow Index (MFI): The MFI is a momentum indicator measuring the strength of money 
going in and out of a security, showing whether the security is overbought or oversold (Chen, 
Chong, and Duan, 2010).  We begin with the “typical price” (TP) defined as: 
𝑇𝑃𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
ℎ+𝑃𝑡
𝑙+𝑃𝑡
𝑐
3
                   
where, 𝑃𝑡
ℎ is the highest price at t,, 𝑃𝑡
𝑙 is the lowest price, and 𝑃𝑡
𝑐 is the closing price.  The money 
flow is then defined as: 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟.  If  𝑇𝑃𝑡 > 𝑇𝑃𝑡−1 then the 
money flow at time 𝑡 is considered positive.  The total money flow over the previous N periods 
(N = 5 in this study) is calculated as: 
𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑡 = 100 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡+𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
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Put-call Volume ratio (PCV): The put-call trading volume is one of the most popular indicators 
of investor sentiment (Brown and Cliff, 2004).  It is defined as the ratio of the trading volume of 
put options to the trading volume of call options, i.e.  𝑃𝐶𝑉 =
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
.  We calculate the PCV 
for the UK using FTSE100 index option put and call trading volumes. 
 
Put-call Open Interest ratio (PCO): Wang, Keswani, & Taylor (2006) suggested that option 
open interest is more likely to be a better predictor of volatility than PCV, and therefore a better 
measure of investor sentiment.  For the UK we computed PCO, from the FTSE100 index option 
as the ratio of put open interest to call open interest.  
 
Relative Strength Index (RSI): RSI is widely used as a market indicator showing whether the 
market is oversold or overbought (Chen, Chong, and Duan, 2010).  The market is thought to be 
overbought when RSI exceeds 80, and oversold when it is less than 20.  The RSI is defined as: 
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡 = 100 ×
∑ (𝑃𝑡−1−𝑃𝑡−𝑖−1)+
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ |𝑃𝑡−1−𝑃𝑡−𝑖−1|
𝑛
𝑖=1
                  
where 𝑃𝑡  is the price at time 𝑡 ; (𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−𝑖−1)+ = 𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−𝑖−1  if 𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−𝑖−1 > 0 , 
otherwise (𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−𝑖−1)+ = 0.  We use n = 14 to calculate the RSI in this paper.  
 
Realized volatility (VOLA): Brown and Cliff (2004) use realized volatility calculated from 
Open-High-Low-Close data to construct a sentiment indicator.  The realized volatility measure 
used in this study is calculated using the extreme value method of Parkinson (1980), based on the 
daily high and low of the FTSE100 index future price.  High VOLA indicates a low investor 
sentiment. 
 
Trading Volume (VRA): Baker and Stein (2004) argue that market confidence is related to 
liquidity and that trading volume is a noisy measure of liquidity.  We follow Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) and use: 
𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑡 = 100 ×
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑀𝐴5𝑡
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑀𝐴50𝑡
                    
where  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑀𝐴5𝑡 is the average turnover for the past 5 periods, and 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑀𝐴50 is the average 
turnover for the past 50 periods.  
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Appendix 2: Definition of crisis event periods 
There are four crisis periods defined as from a starting date; the period prior to this date is the 
pre-crisis period; the crisis period follows from the starting date, and then reversion to normal.  
The start of each crisis is dated by a combination of big events indicating market instability and 
the effects starting to have a significant impact on UK market price.  The Asian crisis starts on 
17
th
 October 1997, when the new Taiwan dollar was devalued and the Hong Kong dollar was 
attacked again.  The Hang Seng index fell 23% in three days and the FTSE350 fell nearly 10% in 
the next two weeks.  The Russian crisis starts on 20
th
 July 1998, when Russia raised the interest 
rate to over 100%.  The FTSE350 reached a high of 2972.3, and then fell nearly 25% over the 
next 2½ months to 2239.1.  The Dotcom bubble crash date is 10
th
 March 2000, when the 
technology-heavy NASDAQ Composite index peaked at 5048.62 and then fell by over 70% in 
the next 2 years.  The 2007-8 Global financial crisis is dated at 19
th
 July 2007, when the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average closed above 14000 for the first time in its history and then fell by more 
than 36% over the following 1½ years.  
Crisis Pre-Crisis Period In-Crisis Period 
Asian Financial Crisis 17/10/1996-16/10/1997 17/10/1997-30/01/1998 
Russian Financial Crisis 02/02/1998-20/07/1998 20/07/1998-29/01/1999 
Dotcom bubble & crash 10/03/1999-09/03/2000 10/03/2000-09/03/2001 
2007-8 Global Financial Crisis 19/07/2006-17/07/2007 19/07/2007-18/07/2008 
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